Communication between natural or artificial agents relies on the use of a common vocabulary. Since sharing terms does not necessarily imply that the terms have exactly the same meanings for all agents, integrating (trigger) statements into a formal ontology requires mechanisms for resolving conflicts that are caused by the ambiguity of terms specified in different but similar ontologies.
Introduction
Communication between natural or artificial agents relies on the use of common terms with shared meanings. This precondition, however, cannot always be established in advance. While human users of natural language have flexible means for handling situations where different readings of the same term become obvious, such mechanisms of reinterpretation are not well studied for logic-based agents.
The approach presented in this article aims at handling the communication between agents that hold kindred ontologies for a common domain where terminological conflicts are the exception rather than the rule. Therefore no preprocessing stage of aligning the ontologies is assumed. A sender generates a consistent sequence of statements based on its ontology and the receiver integrates these statements into its ontology. The terminological differences are discovered when the sender presents statements that conflict with the ontology of the receiver.
In the case of observing a conflict, the receiver could request a specification of the critical terms and start an ontology-integration process on this basis [9] , [21] . Formal approaches to semantic integration mainly focus on the problem of integrating two ontologies and of establishing a semantic mapping between the name spaces of different (accessible) ontologies. 1 However, we will look at a different strategy to treat the conflicts identified during a communication process. The incoming sequence of statements is incrementally integrated into the initial ontology and thereby the conflicts are resolved one by one. Within the classification of approaches to ontology change by Flouris and colleagues [6] , the approach presented in this article resolves terminological conflicts in the process of ontology merging.
The successful integration of conflicting information into a knowledge base is wellstudied in the context of theories of belief change. Within this area, operators for belief revision [1] and operators for belief update [12] are formalized. Operators for belief revision resolve conflicts based on the assumption that the knowledge base contains incorrect statements. Operators for belief update resolve conflicts based on the assumption that the knowledge base contains outdated statements. In both cases, the possibility of conflicts based on terminological ambiguity is not considered, the vocabulary of the knowledge base is kept constant, and the elimination of statements conflicting with the new information from the knowledge base is accepted.
In this article, we define operators for ontology revision that combine an ontology and a statement (of restricted syntactic complexity) yielding an ontology combining the information from both sources. Observed conflicts between the ontology and the incoming statements are resolved by assuming the involved concept terms to be ambiguous. According to the observation that different readings of an ambiguous term are in many cases semantically related, the distinction between the different readings will also involve hypotheses on their semantic relatedness. Since the integration of conflicting statements involves the distinction between different readings of one term, we call the underlying strategy reinterpretation.
An example of such a knowledge integration scenario is a knowledge-based software agent (R) that holds an ontology O R and sends a request (e.g., 'List all cheap books on thermodynamics') to a book-selling agent (S). Agent S generates a response using its own ontology O S , and sends the response as a sequence of statements (e.g., describing the offered books including their price). Agent R integrates the statements into its ontology by successively applying the ontology-revision operator and resolves conflicts that occur due to the difference between O R and O S , thereby, e.g., discovering that the term cheap has a broader meaning in O S than in O R . The receiver can choose to stick to its initial reading of the common term cheap or to use the broader reading in the following communication. In the latter case we will say that the terminology of the resulting ontology is adapted to the terminology of the sender.
The meaning of the terms used in communication is based on the ontologies the participating agents hold [19] . For an agent whose ontology is consistent and welltried, the treatment of terminological conflicts observed in communication should not lead to the loss of (parts of) the initial ontology. Thus, in adapting to the terminology of the book-selling agent, the customer agent needs not give up its own cheap-concept and the relations this concept has to other concepts within the ontology, even though it has learned that the book-selling agent uses a different reading of the term cheap. For this reason, belief-revision operators based on the AGM postulates [1] or beliefupdate operators according to [12] are not directly applicable.
While the loss of (parts of) the initial ontology is not acceptable, the initial on-tology cannot (in its initial form) be part of the resulting ontology either, if the resulting ontology contains the conflicting statement (in its initial form). However, the initial ontology can be preserved by shifting it to a slightly different name space within the resulting ontology yielding a semantic mapping. The meaning the initial ontology assigns to the ambiguous term can be preserved by representing it using a new symbol in the resulting ontology, which assigns a new meaning to the common term in accordance with axioms specifying the semantic interrelation between the two readings. The semantic mapping maps the common vocabulary to the symbols representing their initial readings within the resulting ontology. The ontology-revision operator defined along this line is a non-monotonic belief-change operator, since the initial ontology is not preserved in its initial form. We will present (Section 4) a collection of ontology-revision operators that differ regarding their adaptability to the terminology of the trigger and regarding the hypotheses on the semantic relatedness between the two readings they employ. The operators are evaluated based on several criteria, including the criteria developed for belief revision (Section 5) . This evaluation will show the similarities between belief revision and ontology revision as well as the differences. Furthermore, we will show in which sense and to which extent the ontology-revision operators in the case of integrating conflicting statements yield conservative extensions of the initial ontology, i.e. purely terminological changes (Section 6).
Iterated ontology revision results in a sequence of ontologies starting from an initial ontology. If the sequence of triggers to be integrated is consistent, then the resulting ontologies should include more and more of the information from the sequence. If non-monotone belief-change operators are used to integrate consistent sequences of statements into a knowledge base, statements from the beginning of a sequence need not be contained in the resulting knowledge base after integrating the whole sequence. In addition, within a longer process of integrating statements using an ontologyrevision operator, the meaning of a common term can shift more than once, if the hypotheses on the semantic relatedness prove too strong.
The concepts of convergence (for sequences based on infinite sets of triggers) [24] or stability (for sequences based on finite sets of triggers) [13] allow one to formalize that the sequence of statements is integrated on the long run. If a belief-change operator can guarantee that for every initial ontology and every consistent sequence with finitely many trigger statements the sequence of ontologies will become constant at some point, then the operator can be called stable. We use the concept of stability to investigate the iterated application of the ontology-revision operators rather than the concept of convergence, since in the setting of communicating agents only finite sets of statements will have to be integrated. Following the investigations on iterated belief revision in the context of learning theory [13] , [14] , [16] , [24] , we will investigate how ontology-revision operators behave in iterated application (Section 7). The investigations on iterated ontology revision integrating sequences of statements show the consequences of adapting the terminology based on conflicts and can form the basis for considering iterated ontology revision where in each step an ontology is integrated.
Related Work
Ontology revision based on reinterpretation is an approach for integrating conflicting information into an ontology. The initial ontology is recognizable within the resulting ontology due to a semantic mapping between the common terms and symbols representing the reading assigned to the term by the initial ontology. Correspondingly, ontology revision is closely related to belief change and approaches to ontology integration that treat conflicts based on ambiguity.
Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] present a systematic and formal treatment of belief-change operators. Belief-change operators are meant to model the human ability to change beliefs in the presence of trustworthy information conflicting with the current beliefs. AGM [1] consider settings in which the conflict is based on false information and specify principles guiding the (rational) revision of beliefs by rationality postulates. Beliefs are characterized by belief sets, which are sets of formulae that are closed with respect to a logical consequence operator. Belief change is formalized in terms of binary belief-revision functions that map a belief set and a formula (the information triggering the change) onto a new belief set. The rationality postulates are axiom-like specifications of belief-revision functions. Additionally, AGM provide specific belief-revision functions that fulfill the rationality postulates.
Post-AGM work on belief revision considers also the revision of (finite) belief bases, allowing the definition of belief-revision operators based on a finite representation of the beliefs of an agent. Approaches to belief-base revision in the sense of [11] define belief-revision functions for which the revision results depends on the syntactic structure of the belief bases. Approaches on the revision of knowledge bases ( [3] , [5] ) define syntax-independent operators that are defined on and result in finite representations of belief sets.
In the intended settings of belief revision, conflicts are caused by false information and not by terminological mismatch. Since erasing wrong beliefs is a rational treatment of conflicts, belief revision is concerned with identifying formulae that should not be preserved rather than with the question of how all initial beliefs can be preserved. Nevertheless, the approach to ontology revision discussed below employs techniques developed in the context of belief revision.
Based on the work of Meyer, Lee and Booth [17] on knowledge integration strategies for stratified description-logic knowledge bases, Qi, Liu and Bell [22] define revision operators for description-logic knowledge bases. The two knowledge bases combined have different roles regarding the revision operator. The knowledge base to be integrated will be called the trigger knowledge base and the other knowledge base will be called the initial knowledge base in the following. Qi, Liu and Bell show that their operators fulfill the main conditions specified for rational belief-revision functions by AGM. But as their operators are applied to finite knowledge bases rather than belief sets, the syntactic structure of the knowledge base can have an effect on the resulting knowledge base. In order to minimize the effect of the syntactic form and to carry over as much information from the initial knowledge base as possible, axioms of the initial knowledge base responsible for a conflict are replaced by weaker axioms that do not yield a conflict, i.e., an axiom β is replaced by an (certain) axiom β w , which is a consequence of β. The main components of the weakened axioms are exception lists, which can be specified in certain description logics. For example, axioms of the form 'All Cs are Ds' are weakened to axioms of the form 'All Cs except a 1 , . . . , a n are Ds'. The revision operators of [22] are successful in the sense that the trigger knowledge base is included in the resulting knowledge base, but the initial knowledge base need not be preserved.
The consistency-based approach of Delgrande and Schaub [5] for the revision of propositional belief sets uses language extensions similar to the ontology-revision operators defined in Section 4. The input knowledge base (O) and trigger statement (α) of the belief-change operators are formulated based on a common vocabulary V c . In the case of conflict, a disjoint vocabulary V p and a substitution (· ) mapping V c to V p is introduced, such that every propositional letter p ∈ V c is mapped to a p ∈ V p . Applying this substitution to O results in a renamed variant O . To semantically interconnect the two sets of symbols and thereby restore propositions from O formulated with V c , bi-implications of the type p ↔ p , p ∈ V c are added to O . The definition of the belief-change operators select (inclusion) maximal sets of such bi-implications (EQ) consistent with the union of the trigger statement and O . To dispose of the propositions using V p while retaining as much content formulated in V c as possible, the resulting set O ∪ {α} ∪ EQ is deductively closed and intersected with L(V c ), the propositional language using propositional letters from V c . Thus, the bi-implications and the propositions using V p are auxiliary means for the revision step, but do not occur in the revision result.
Delgrande and Schaub [5] define two belief-revision operators, a choice-revision operator c , which is based on selecting one maximal set of bi-implications, and a skeptical-revision operator . The revision results O c α, O α are knowledge bases over the common vocabulary that do not preserve the initial belief set O. Furthermore, the operators are defined for propositional logic and are not directly applicable to more expressive logical frameworks required to model terminological changes in ontologies.
The permanent extension of the used vocabulary and a terminological shift is the result of the proposal to integrate conflicting description-logic ontologies by Goeb and colleagues [9] . They specify an algorithm that takes as input two ontologies O R and O S and yield a new ontology and two semantic mappings that map the symbols of the initial ontologies to the symbols of the resulting ontology. The common vocabulary of O R and O S is preserved in the resulting ontology, but the three ontologies can assign three different readings to the symbols of the common vocabulary.
Inconsistencies between O R and O S are resolved by applying two substitutions σ R , σ S replacing common terms (c) by different symbols (cσ R , cσ S ) in the two ontologies, yielding compatible ontologies Oσ R and Oσ S . The common symbol (c) is added as a common super-concept (or superordinate role symbol) to the two new symbols. In an additional step, individual axioms of Oσ R or Oσ S using cσ R or cσ S for which the replacement of the new symbol by the common symbol is compatible with the intermediate ontology are replaced by the version using the common symbol. Consequently, the common terms of the resulting ontology neither represent the receiver's nor the sender's reading. Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that the initial ontologies are (homogeneously) preserved in the sense that Oσ R or Oσ S are consequences of the integration result [21] .
A systematic evaluation of belief-revision functions with respect to incremental integration of consistent sequences of trigger statements is studied by Kelly [13] , [14] , Martin and Osherson [16] , and Zhang and Foo [24] . They investigate the types of belief-revision functions and restrictions on sequences of trigger statements that lead to sequences of epistemic states stabilizing at or converging to a state corresponding to a model of the trigger statements. The goal is to identify belief-revision operators that provide reliable learning methods despite the fact that belief revision is directed at retaining as much of the original beliefs as possible, while learning requires changing beliefs to minimize the difference between the belief set and the facts describing the world. Learning methods are called reliable if the incremental integration of a consistent trigger sequences leads to sequences of belief sets that stabilize or converge.
Kelly [13] , [14] studied a collection of belief-revision functions with regards to their behavior in iterated application and identified stable operators as well as operators that do not guarantee stable behavior. A result of Zhang and Foo [24] is that revision operators for epistemic states that are not extremely skeptical regarding new statements will converge to a complete knowledge state identifying a model of the trigger statements. We will show that some ontology-revision operators that adapt to the terminology of the trigger sequences lead to stabilizing sequences of ontologies that include the statements of the trigger sequence. However, ontology-revision operators that use stronger hypotheses regarding the semantic relations between the different readings of the common term can, depending on the structure of the trigger sequence, lead to closer approximations of the source ontology or lead to non-stabilizing integration processes.
Basic Definitions: Description Logic and Ontologies
Throughout this article an ontology will be a finite set of formulae over a descriptionlogic (DL) language. Ontologies will be denoted by O and indexed or primed variants. For arbitrary formulae we will use β and indexed or primed variants. A (DL) vocabulary V includes concept symbols (K, K , K i , . . .), role symbols (R, R , R i ), and constants (a, b, c, a , a i , . . .). An ontology over a vocabulary V is a finite set of formulae in which all non-logical symbols are in V. V(O) is the set of the non-logical symbols occurring in O. For V({β}) we write V(β). If V is a vocabulary, then L(V) will be used for the set of all formulae that can be formulated over V. O [K/K ] is the outcome of uniformly replacing the concept symbol K by K in O. An interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) of the vocabulary V is a pair consisting of the nonempty domain ∆ I and a function · I assigning to every constant a ∈ V an element a I ∈ ∆ I , to every concept symbol K ∈ V a set K I ⊆ ∆ I , and to every role symbol R ∈ V a relation
. .) are formed based on a vocabulary and concept constructors. The concept constructors used in this article are listed in Table 1 .
2
The ontology-revision operators discussed in the following can be represented in the description logic ALU. ALU is the DL language that adds the concept constructor for concept union (disjunction) to the language AL, which employs the basic inventory of intersection (conjunction), atomic negation, value restriction and limited existential quantification. The examples and discussions use additional concept constructors for general negation, (unqualified) number restriction, and nominals.
Description-logic formulae can be classified as TBox axioms (terminological knowledge) and ABox axioms (world description). In this article, we will use general concept inclusions (GCI), i.e., formulae of the form C D, and concept equivalences, Name Syntax Semantics 
If for some formula β we have I |= β, then we say that I makes β true or I is a model of β. Two formulae are equivalent (β ≡ β ) iff they have the same models. An interpretation I is a model of a set of formulae M (I |= M ) iff it is a model of every formula of M . A set of formulae is consistent iff it has a model, otherwise, M is inconsistent (M |= ⊥). A sequence of literals A is consistent iffÃ is consistent. Mod(M ) is the set of models of M . Two sets of formulae M 1 and M 2 are equivalent (M 1 ≡ M 2 ) iff they have the same models (Mod(M 1 ) = Mod(M 2 )). A formula β is a consequence of a set of formulae M (M |= β) iff every model of M is a model of β, and a set of formulae M is a consequence of
We will also use |= β to stand for ∅ |= β.
The formal evaluation of the ontology-revision operators will be based on an extended logical language combining description logic and propositional logic. In this language, the description-logic formulae (TBox axioms and ABox axioms) play the role of atomic formulae. Additionally, we use equalities (a . = b) and inequalities (a . = b) (with the semantics I |= (a
as atomic formulae to analyze and express the role of unique name assumptions. However, equalities and inequalities are not assumed to be contained in the sequences of literals representing the trigger statements. The atomic formulae can be combined in the style of propositional logic. Thus, β could be ¬R(a, b) ∨ (R(b, a) ∧ R(a, a)). Because of their close semantic relatedness, we will not distinguish the symbols for propositional negation and concept negation.
If M is a set of literals over vocabulary V, then the set of inequalities expressing the unique name assumption implicit in M is una ( 
If A is a sequence of literals, then we will write una(A) instead of una(Ã). Note that any set of literals M is inconsistent if and only if there is a concept symbol K and a constant a, such that {K(a), ¬K(a)} ⊆ M . Thus, a set of literals is inconsistent if and only if its implicit unique name assumption is inconsistent.
The (global) strong ontology-revision operators of [20] are defined with reference to the most specific concept assigned by an ontology to a constant. C is a most specific concept for a in the ontology O iff O |= C(a) and for all C such that O |= C (a) also |= C C . The existence of a finite representation of a most specific concept depends on the ontology O and the underlying description logic. 3 We assume that there is some systematic way (e.g. an ordering over concept descriptions) to pick out for every constant a a representative of the most specific concept in an ontology O. This representative will be denoted by msc O (a).
Ontology-Revision Operators: Definitions
Ontology-revision operators are binary operators that map an ontology (O) and a literal (α) to another ontology (O • α) that represents the integrated information of O and α. As we define ontologies as finite sets of formulae, the ontology-revision operators take as first arguments sets of formulae that are not deductively closed. In this respect our ontology-revision operators are comparable with belief-revision functions operating on belief bases [11] and not on belief sets, which are defined as deductively closed sets of formulae [1] . A formula that occurs as the second argument of an ontology-revision operator is called a trigger statement or just trigger.
If the trigger α is compatible with O, then it can be added to O to derive the new ontology O∪{α}. Correspondingly, the case that O∪{α} is consistent is handled by all belief-change operators and the ontology-revision operators defined in this section in this way. If the trigger α is not compatible with ontology O, then the ontology-revision operators based on reinterpretation defined and analyzed in this article capture the assumption that the incompatibility is caused by an ambiguity in the common vocabulary. If a conflict between O and α derives from an underlying ambiguity of a common term (K) and the goal is to represent both readings in the resulting ontology, then this goal can be achieved by enriching the terminology. Correspondingly, two readings of a term used in O and in α are distinguished in the resulting ontology and a new symbol (K ) is introduced to represent one of the readings.
To systematically distinguish between the common symbols and the new symbols, we will assume in the following that the vocabulary used by the receiver can be partitioned into a common vocabulary (V c ) and an internal or private vocabulary (V p ), such that the symbols of V p cannot be used by the sender. The symbols introduced in the reinterpretation process are private symbols. We assume that V p provides infinitely many symbols not used in the receiver's ontology O. We additionally assume in the following definitions that the choice of a symbol K ∈ V p in the reinterpretation step is uniquely determined by the symbol K and V p \ V(O).
The strong ontology-revision operators 1 and 2 (Definition 4.1) differ regarding which reading (the reading represented in O vs. the reading underlying α) is denoted by the new symbol K after integrating the trigger statement. The type-1 operator 1 uses the new symbol to represent the reading underlying the trigger statement and continues to represent the reading specified by the initial ontology by the common symbol. Correspondingly, it does not add the trigger statement α but α [K/K ] to the ontology. The type-2 operator 2 internalizes the reading assigned by the initial ontology to the common symbol by replacing every occurrence of the common term in the initial ontology with the new symbol. The common symbol is used to represent the reading underlying the trigger statement. Correspondingly, the type-2 operator adds the trigger statement in its initial form to the modified initial ontology. Regarding the common term K, 1 preserves the terminology of the ontology O while 2 adapts to the terminology of the trigger α. The operators 1 and 2 are structurally similar in the sense that one operator can be derived from the other by a simple syntactic transformation. In the case of inconsistency,
If a common term is ambiguous and the different readings are not semantically related, then the statement of the sender does not have any value for the receiver. Unfortunately, the trigger statement does not specify the reading of the common symbols it uses. However, hypotheses regarding the relation of the alternative reading to the terminology specified in the ontology can be added (and in later steps revised, if necessary). Therefore, both operators declare upper and lower bounds for the reading underlying the trigger statement. They implement the assumption that one of the readings of the ambiguous terms is more general than the other (as expressed by
The observed conflict gives evidence as to which subsumption relation has to be excluded.
The strong operators add additional bounds to minimize the semantic difference between the two readings. They exploit the ontology regarding its specification of the constant that is involved in the conflict. This constant denotes the only known entity that is a witness for the ambiguity of the term and for the difference between the two readings. The second bound based on msc O (a) stands for the hypothesis that only objects that are similar to this witness will be further examples of the difference.
Definition 4.1
Let O be an ontology over the vocabulary V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, K ∈ V c a concept symbol and a ∈ V c a constant for which msc O (a) exists. Let K ∈ V p be a concept symbol not used in O. Then the strong ontology-revision operators of type 1 and 2 ( 1 and 2 ) are defined for literals by
Grove's idea of so called sphere-based belief revision developed in [10] , Wassermann/Fermé [23] defined operations for revising a concept complex 4 by a new piece of information, resulting in a new concept. These ideas were adapted in [20] to define two types of ontology-revision operators in a local and a global variant respectively. The strong operators correspond to the global variants.
5 They are called strong, because we will define and discuss weaker ontology-revision operators in the following. The local operators are defined with respect to a system of spheres for the concept symbol K, which represent suitable generalizations of K. The use of the most specific concept in the specification of the global operators results as a common generalization of the local operators [20] .
The bounds referring to the most specific concept are comparable with the weakenings of Qi, Liu and Bell [22] . For example, the inclusion axiom
This formula says that all individuals that instantiate K but do not instantiate the most specific concept of a also instantiate K . In description logics that provide the concept constructor for nominals, the most specific concept of a in O can (in the context of O) be represented by {a}. Thus we have K ¬{a} K , which says that all K except a are K . Such axioms correspond to the form of weakened axioms used in the definitions of the operators • w , • rw in [22] .
To analyze the difference between the two types of ontology-revision operators, we will investigate iterated applications of the operators based on sequences of trigger statements. This will lead to a more formal explication of the informal notion of adaptation to the terminology of the trigger. Since the difference between the type-1 operator and the type-2 operator does not crucially depend on the bound employing the most specific concept, we broaden the discussion to a range of operator pairs. Definition 4.2 specifies the weak ontology-revision operators ⊗ 1 and ⊗ 2 , which does not refer to most specific concepts. Furthermore, it does not employ the constructor for concept union ( ) and yields TBox axioms that can be embedded in definitorial TBoxes. The weak ontology-revision operators can therefore be used in the context of any description-logic system that is capable of expressing the trigger sequence and handle definitions.
Definition 4.2
Let O be an ontology over the vocabulary V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, K ∈ V c a concept symbol and a ∈ V c a constant. Let K ∈ V p be a new concept symbol. Then the weak ontology-revision operators of type 1 and 2 (⊗ 1 and ⊗ 2 ) are defined (for literals) by
A concept complex according to [23] comprises a concept and descriptions for its prototypical instances.
5 cf. [20] , p. 87. A limitation of the definitions for 1 and 2 in [20] is that they are restricted to positive literals as trigger statements. To generalize the applicability of the ontology-revision operators, Definition 4.1 extends the definitions of the operators to deal also with negative literals as triggers. The extension of the definitions to other types of trigger statements needs to handle more than one candidate for reinterpretation and is developed in [21] .
We demonstrate the effects of the ontology-revision operators with an example of simple ontologies in a book-trading scenario.
Example 4.3
An agent (receiver) using an ontology O R wants to buy a cheap book on thermodynamics in an online bookshop (sender) that uses the ontology O S . According to O R something is cheap if and only if it costs less than 5 Euros. That a book cannot have a soft cover and a hard cover at the same time is captured by the axiom SoftC ¬HardC in O R . O R also specifies that anything that costs less than 5 Euros costs less than 8 Euros. Furthermore, the receiver has some knowledge about four books on thermodynamics. Book th 1 costs between 5 and 8 Euros, the books th 3 and th 4 cost more than 5 Euros, while book th 2 costs less than 5 Euros. th 1 is a hardcover book, th 4 is a softcover book, but for th 2 and th 3 the book type is not known to the receiver. To the request to list cheap books on thermodynamics available, the online bookshop answers (α) that the book named th 1 is cheap.
The different readings of Cheap lead to the inconsistency of O R ∪{α}. If the receiver decides to use the weak ontology-revision operator of type 2 for the integration of α, the outcome of the integration is If the receiver uses the strong type-2 operator for the integration, the result can be represented as
In this case it is assumed that the sender calls something cheap only if it costs less than 5 Euros or costs between 5 and 8 Euros and is a hardcover book. For both O S and O R 2 α the formula Cheap CostLt_5 (CostLt_8 HardC) is a consequence. As in the case of the integration with ⊗ 2 , the literal ¬Cheap(th 3 ) is not a consequence of O R 2 α. However in this case, the literal ¬Cheap(th 4 ) is preserved, i.e., O R 2 α |= ¬Cheap(th 4 ). The difference derives from th 4 being known to be a softcover book and, thus, not similar to th 1 , the only known witness of the difference between the two readings of Cheap, whereas the type of book is not known for th 2 and th 3 (see Proposition 6.4.4).
The scheme underlying the definitions of the ontology-revision operators i and ⊗ i for (i ∈ {1, 2}) can be generalized to the definition of a family of operators that differ regarding the specification of the second bound for the new concept. Let sel stand for a selection function that selects upper-bound axioms for the new concept. As possible upper bounds we take concepts that are both more general than the lower bound and will not add new information to the known instance a. Then the selection function sel can be a parameter in the specification of the operators ⊕ sel i .
Definition 4.4
Let O be an ontology over the vocabulary V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, K ∈ V c a concept symbol, a ∈ V c a constant, and α = K(a) or α = ¬K(a). Let i ∈ {1, 2} and K ∈ V p be the new concept symbol introduced to form O ⊗ i α. Then the upper-bound axioms based on O for α and K (ub i (O, α, K )) and the ontology-revision operators of type 1 and 2 based on sel (⊕ sel 1 and ⊕ sel 2 ) are defined (for literals) by
else 6 If upper-bound axioms are selected for the type-1 operator in the positive case from {K C | O |= C(a) and O |= (K C)} (and in a corresponding way in the other cases), then the constructor for concept union is not needed. However, in this case the inclusion property Observation 5.1.1, p. 14, can be violated.
If the selection function sel selects the empty set or another set of tautological formulae, one gets an operator with the same semantic effect as the weak operator ⊗ i . If sel returns the complete set or any set that contains the upper bound derived from msc O (a), one gets an operator with the same semantic effect as the strong operator i .
One simple form of selection is to (syntactically) evaluate the assertions of the ontology. This idea is captured in the definition of the revision operators ⊕ expl i . The proof of the instability of the stronger ontology-revision operators is based on ⊕
Then the functions ub i,expl deriving upper-bound axioms based on explicit concept assertions and the ontology-revision operator based on explicit concept assertions (⊕ expl i ) are given by 
Basic Properties of the Ontology-Revision Operators
The following observations directly result from the definitions of the operators.
α, γ be literals with V({α, γ}) ⊆ V c , and A a finite sequence of literals over V c . Let • be any ontology-revision operator, • 1 be an ontology-revision operator of type 1, • 2 be an ontology-revision operator of type 2, and i ∈ {1, 2}.
(vacuity for iterated •)
(consistency for iterated •) The slight weakenings of the inclusion and consistency postulates suggest that the ontology-revision operators are not rational belief-revision functions as defined by [1] and [8] . To pay tribute to the difference regarding inclusion and to the fact that type-1 operators do not fulfill success, we call the operators defined in Section 4 ontology-revision operators rather than belief-revision operators.
Ontology-revision operators take as first arguments finite sets of formulae. In this sense, they are comparable with revision functions for belief bases. But in contrast to operators for belief-base revision that fulfill the inclusion postulate for belief bases (O * α ⊆ O∪{α}) weak and strong ontology-revision operators fulfill left extensionality (Observations 5.1.5, 5.1.6). Therefore, ontology-revision operators are comparable to revision operators for knowledge bases (like the operators defined by Dalal [3] or Delgrande and Schaub [5] ), which fulfill left extensionality but do not fulfill the inclusion postulate for belief bases.
Since conflicts between the ontology O and the trigger statement α are resolved by the ontology-revision operators, the operators cannot be both monotone regarding O and successful regarding α. Type-1 operators are monotone (5.1.9) and not necessarily successful, while type-2 operators are successful (5.1.8) but not monotone. As type-1 operators do not fulfill the success postulate, they cannot be classified as beliefexpansion operators (cf. [7] , p. 49). While the observations 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.1.9, and 5.1.13 can be generalized to statement sequences (5.
Proof. See p. 26.
Conservativity
Type-1 operators preserve the terminology of the initial ontology. Formally, preservation of the terminology means that terminological shifts result in conservative extensions. More specifically, type-1 operators yield conservative extensions of an ontology in cases of triggers that conflict with the ontology. Proof. See p. 26.
As the receiver wants to enrich his knowledge, he is not generally interested in conservative extensions. If a trigger statement α is compatible with the ontology O, then the sender and the receiver have compatible readings of the common symbols. Correspondingly, if O∪{α} is consistent and O |= α, then the integration result O∪{α} is not a conservative extension. As a consequence it is not the case that for all finite sequences A the ontology O • 1 A is a conservative extension of O. Type-1 operators preserve the terminology of the initial ontology in the sense that the integration of sequences of statements is a combination of conservative extensions and accepting statements. Observation 6.3 states that for ontology-revision operators of type 1 the effect of integrating sequences of trigger statement can be decomposed into the simple addition of some statements from the sequence and a conservative extension. A restricted form of conservativity in the case of inconsistency can also be proved for operators of type 2. As type-2 operators adapt to the terminology of the sender, the main question for these operators in the context of conservativity is to describe the parts of the receiver's initial ontology that are preserved in the common language along the integration and the conditions under which the preservation holds.
Proposition 6.4 states a combination of success and restricted conservativity properties for the type-2 operators in the case of reinterpretation. It generalizes and formalizes the observations on preservation and asymmetry mentioned in Example 4.3. More precisely, Assertion 6.4.1 states conservativity for all formulae β that do not contain one of the concept symbols involved in the reinterpretation. Because type-2 operators are successful regarding the trigger statement, the trigger statement constitutes an exception to conservativity. Assertion 6.4.2 expresses restricted conservativity for those literals in which the reinterpreted symbol occurs with the same negation prefix (negation vs. no negation symbol) as in the trigger. It makes the entity mentioned by the trigger statement the only exception to conservativity for literals of this form. Regarding literals in which the reinterpreted symbol occurs with a complementary negation prefix, the strong and the weak operators differ. Assertion 6.4.3 expresses that ⊗ 2 does not preserve any literal in which the reinterpreted symbol K occurs with a complementary negation prefix. In contrast to this, revision with the strong operator 2 preserves such literals for those constants that are known to differ from a regarding some property (Assertion 6.4.4). Given the mixed results regarding the literals, for more complex formulae involving the reinterpreted symbol simple preservation conditions cannot be formulated.
Proposition 6.4
Let O be an ontology over the vocabulary V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, K ∈ V c be a concept symbol, and a, c ∈ V c be constants, such that msc O (a) exists. Let α = K(a) and γ = K(c) or α = ¬K(a) and γ = ¬K(c). Let K ∈ V p \ V(O) be the new symbol introduced in O • 2 α, and β be a formula with
Stability
The monotonicity of • 1 (Observation 5.1.10) leads to the preservation of conflicts: If O ∪ {α} is inconsistent, then O • 1 A ∪ {α} is also inconsistent. Thus, if O ∪ {α} is inconsistent, even repeated occurrences of α in A cannot result in O • 1 A |= α. In this sense, the type-1 operators do not lead to an adaptation to the terminology of the trigger sequence but rigidly cling to the terminology of O.
In contrast to type-1 operators, type-2 operators are successful regarding the trigger statement if applied once (Observation 5.1.8). However, due to their non-monotone behavior regarding the ontology, a literal from a trigger sequence need not be a consequence of the ontology resulting from adding a longer sequence of triggers to the initial ontology. Then
}, so the repeated integration of the sequence A yields an ontology that includes the information contained in A.
Since the information from the trigger sequence can get lost, the repetition of statements in the trigger sequence can be helpful to ensure that these statements are included in the final ontology. Therefore, we will study the question, for which operators repetitions in the trigger sequence can guarantee that all statements of the trigger sequence are consequences of the final ontology. As including the same literal twice (three times, four times etc.) in the trigger sequence may still not be enough to guarantee success, we will also consider infinite sequences, in which literals can re-occur infinitely often. Some fundamental incompatibilities between the statement sequence to be integrated and the initial ontology can enforce instability of the derived sequence of ontologies for any ontology-revision operator. For example, if the trigger sequence is inconsistent, then stabilization cannot be expected. However, if the trigger sequence stems from one source ontology and this ontology is consistent, also A is consistent. Consequently, we will evaluate the behavior of the operators mainly with respect to consistent trigger sequences.
9 Furthermore, the sequence of ontologies need not stabilize in cases where the underlying ontologies disagree regarding the identities of the constants' referents. This can be demonstrated by Example 7.4. More generally, if according to the ontology of the receiver one object is denoted by different constants a, b but according to the ontology of the sender a, b denote different objects, then this mismatch can lead to non-stabilizing sequences of ontologies for an operator that resolves conflicts by reinterpreting concept symbols. Therefore, we will focus on combinations of sequences and ontologies, where the resulting ontologies are compatible with unique name assumptions implicit in the trigger sequence. This restriction will avoid anomalies as demonstrated in Example 7.4. Furthermore, we will focus on sequences based on finite sets of literals.
Definition 7.5
Ontology-revision operator • is stable iff for any consistent ontology O and sequence A of literals with finiteÃ such that for every n ∈ N the set
If an ontology-revision operator is not stable, then we call it unstable.
Even though we formulated the property of stability for ontology-revision operators in general, it is obvious that type-1 operators are not stable, due to the fact, that type-1 operators are monotone and therefore preserve conflicts. A receiver who uses a type-1 operator does not change its terminology when integrating conflicting trigger information. The initial ontology is included in the resulting ontology and the common symbol involved in the conflict is specified by the resulting ontology in the same way as in the initial ontology. However, the resulting ontology is a proper extension of the initial ontology. The situation is different for the operators of type 2. Type-2 operators are non-monotone and fulfill success in one-step application. Hence type-2 operators might be stable if all conflicts between the initial ontology and the trigger sequence get resolved during the integration process (see Observation 5.1.4).
Stability of ⊗ 2
The main result of this article is the stability of the weak ontology-revision operator of type 2 (⊗ 2 ) and the instability of several stronger ontology-revision operators of type 2, namely 2 and ⊕ expl 2 . To show the stability of ⊗ 2 , we will argue (Corollary 7.9) that given an ontology O and a sequence of literals A = α n n∈I :
1. If a conflict resolution for a literal α i = K(a) is done in step i, then all ontologies derived at later steps are compatible with any α j = K(b) if they are compatible with una(A j ).
2. If a conflict resolution for a literal α i = ¬K(a) is done in step i, then all ontologies derived at later steps are compatible with any α j = ¬K(b) if they are compatible with una(A j ).
3. There can be at most two conflict resolutions with respect to the same concept symbol if all ontologies derived are compatible with una(A).
The first two items show that the conflict resolution of the operator ⊗ 2 is carried out on the terminological level rather than on the level of statements.
The details of the argument for the stability of ⊗ 2 are given in Appendix I. In the following, we will provide some useful definitions and sketch the main steps of the complete proof. The proof is based on the observation that the set of literals from the trigger sequence that are involved in conflicts with the receiver's ontology is monotonously reduced during the integration process. Definition 7.6 provides the basis for identifying the conflicting literals from the sequence.
Definition 7.6
Let O be an ontology and A be a sequence of literals with finiteÃ.
is the set of literals of A that are essentially involved in a conflict between O and A.
Lemma 7.7 describes the effect of the integration of a literal from the trigger sequence into an ontology on the set of conflicting literals using a weak ontology-revision operator of type 2. While each step removes at least the integrated literal from the set of conflicting literals, reinterpretation removes every literal that differs from the integrated literal only regarding the constant. In addition, no literals are added to the set of conflicting literals.
Lemma 7.7
Let V be a vocabulary, K, K ∈ V concept symbols, a ∈ V a constant. Let O be an ontology, and A a sequence of literals with finiteÃ, V(O ∪Ã) ⊆ V \ {K }.
If α ∈Ã and O
Proof. See p. 31.
As a consequence of Lemma 7.7 and Definition 4.2, the integration of sequences of literals monotonously reduces the set of conflicting literals, thereby removing any literal that has been integrated at least once. Lemma 7.8 states that a literal that is integrated once will not appear in the set of conflicting literals at a later step.
Lemma 7.8
Let O be an ontology, A a sequence of literals with finiteÃ, α ∈Ã, and A n a finite prefix of A.
CL(O ⊗
Furthermore, conflict resolution guarantees that literals based on the same concept are permanently removed from the set of conflicting literals whenever the unique name assumption implicit in the trigger sequence is compatible with the resulting ontology.
Corollary 7.9
Let V be a vocabulary, K ∈ V a concept symbol, a, c ∈ V constants, O an ontology over V, and A a finite sequence of literals over V.
If the unique name assumption implicit in a sequence is not violated during the integration of the sequence into an ontology using the weak revision operator of type 2, no concept symbol is reinterpreted more than twice.
Proof. See p. 32.
The following Corollary 7.10 expresses a weakening of success in the case of iterated application of the weak ontology-revision operator. It expresses that all conflicts between O and A n get resolved as O ⊗ 2 A n is compatible withÃ n .
Corollary 7.10
Let O be a consistent ontology over V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, and A a sequence of literals over V c with finiteÃ. Then for all prefixes A n of A:
Proof. According to Lemma 7.8.
∪Ã n is consistent as well, according to Definition 7.6.
As obvious from Lemma 7.8.2 and Observation 5.1.4, the repetition of a finite sequence of literals leads to the entailment of the content of the sequence if the weak ontology-revision operator of type 2 is used, as stated in Corollary 7.11.
Corollary 7.11
Let O be a consistent ontology and A a finite sequence of literals, such that
As a further consequence of Lemma 7.8, the stability of ⊗ 2 can be proved.
Theorem 7.12
The weak ontology-revision operator of type 2 (⊗ 2 ) is stable.
The stability of the weak revision operator of type 2 derives from reducing the set of literals essentially involved in conflicts in each revision step. If the unique name assumption implicit in the sequence is not violated during the integration of the sequence, then any literal that is not essentially involved in a conflict at some step can not become essential for a conflict at a later step.
Weakness of ⊗ 2
The stability of the weak ontology-revision operator of type 2 suggests that this operator yields a terminological shift from the initial reading of the common term, as specified in the initial ontology of the receiver, to the reading of the term as specified in the sender's ontology. However, since the receiver gets only the sequence of literals as information about the sender's ontology, it can only adapt to this sequence. In addition, after the second conflict resolution with respect to the same concept symbol, the receiver's reading of the concept symbol is independent from the initial reading it assigned to the concept symbol (represented in the resulting ontology by some other internal concept symbol). This can be illustrated with another book-trading example.
Example 7.13
An agent (receiver) using an ontology O R wants to buy a cheap book on thermodynamics in an online bookshop (sender) that uses the ontology O S .
The receiver's price-for-value judgement is based on nothing but the price. According to O R something is cheap if and only if it costs less than 5 Euros. Furthermore, the receiver knows already that th 1 costs more than 5 Euros (and is not cheap), while th 2 costs less than 5 Euros (and is cheap).
The sender has a more refined cheap-concept in which the upper prize limit depends on one of three disjoint book types-hardcover, softcover, or booklet. That the three book types are exclusive and exhaustive is specified, as well as some knowledge on the order of prices. As th 1 is known to be a hardcover book that costs less than 8 Euros, it is classified as cheap. The booklet th 2 , which costs more than 3 Euros, is not cheap.
HardC(th 1 ), CostLt_8(th 1 ), Booklet(th 2 ), ¬CostLt_3(th 2 )} Assume that the sequence A = Cheap(th 1 ), ¬Cheap(th 2 ) stemming from the sender is integrated into the receiver's ontology using ⊗ 2 , the weak ontology revision operator of type 2. The integration of the positive literal Cheap(th 1 ) demands a reinterpretation of Cheap. The newly introduced symbol Cheap denotes the receiver's initial cheap-concept.
The integration of A into the receiver's ontology O R yields ontology O R ⊗ 2 A from which no subsumption relation between the receiver's initial cheap-concept, denoted by Cheap , and the new cheap-concept, denoted by Cheap, can be derived.
The observation formulated in Example 7.13 can be generalized to show that the interpretation of a concept symbol that was subject to two reinterpretations solely depends on the trigger sequence A and is completely independent of the initial ontology. Theorem 7.14 says that every model I of the resulting ontology that conforms to the unique name assumption of the trigger sequence can be modified in such a way that the interpretation of the concept symbol is restricted by nothing but the trigger sequence and the denotations assigned by I to the constants occurring in the sequence. In this sense, the price to pay for the stability of the ontology-revision operator is the loss of semantic embedding of concept symbols in the resulting ontology.
Theorem 7.14 Let O be a consistent ontology over vocabulary V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, A be a finite, consistent sequence of literals over V c , K ∈ V c be any concept symbol that has been reinterpreted twice during the integration of A into O using the weak revisionoperator of type 2, andÃ K = {β ∈Ã | β contains K} be the set of literals from A using K. Let I be a model of (O ⊗ 2 A) ∪ una(A) and I 
Proof. See p. 33.
The weak ontology-revision operator of type 2 is stable but also unable to yield useful bridging axioms whenever the different readings of the common term are not related by subsumption. Although the operator can integrate different conflicting statements without introducing a conflict into the ontology, the resulting readings of the common term might not be semantically related to the initial reading. This behavior is due to the fact that the weak operator introduces only one bound relating the common symbol and the symbol introduced in the reinterpretation step. Examples 4.3 and 8.13 (in Appendix II) show that the stronger ontology-revision operators of type 2 can yield more useful bridging axioms. The stronger ontology-revision operators use the specification of the critical constant in the ontology to derive additional bridging axioms for the different readings of the common term. Unfortunately, for the stronger operators that introduce a second bound, stability is not guaranteed.
Theorem 7.15
The strong ontology-revision operator of type 2 ( 2 ) and the ontology-revision operator of type 2 using upper-bound axioms based on explicitly introduced concept assertions (⊕ expl 2 ) are not stable.
Proof. Let V c and V p be vocabularies such that V c ∩ V p = ∅, a, b, c, d ∈ V c be constants, and B, C, D, E ∈ V c be concept symbols. Let the ontology O, the finite sequence A, and the infinite sequence A (the infinite repetition of A) be given by
As O is finite and neither O nor A employ role symbols or concept constructors based on constants (i.e. nominals), for any k Furthermore, for any literal α with Although the basic sequence of literals used in the proof is quite long, the underlying structure of the statements is very simple. In particular, the complete example is formulated in a monadic fragment of description logic (without using roles, quantifiers or number restrictions). All concept assertions in the ontology and in the trigger sequence are literals. Thus, the syntactic complexity of the added bridging axioms is minimal. For this construction it is not necessary that the additional bounds are based on computing the most specific concept. Nevertheless, in the given example, the computation of the most specific concept yields exactly the same result as extracting the explicit assertions regarding the given constant.
The combination of Theorem 7.12, Theorem 7.14, and Theorem 7.15 suggests an underlying tradeoff in the sense that the cost of exploiting the ontology to derive hypotheses on the reading of a concept symbol used by a communication partner is the risk to showing unstable behavior regarding repeated input.
Conclusion
The definition of ontology-revision operators based on reinterpretation allows one to resolve conflicts between a well-tried ontology and an incoming statement while preserving both the ontology and the conflicting statement due to the establishment of a semantic mapping between the initial ontology and the resulting ontology. The operators introduced differ regarding whether the meaning of the term specified in the initial ontology will be used as the future reading of the common term (type 1), or, whether an adaptation to the terminology of the communication partner should result (type 2).
Independently of the strength of the operator chosen, type-1 operators yield monotone extensions of the initial ontology, where the vocabulary extension in the case of conflicts is conservative. These features seem to be characteristic of communication partners that do not try to learn from solving communication problems. In the case of artificial agents, implementing the process of information integration based on type-1 operators in an incremental fashion does not seem appropriate when the trigger sequence stems from a constant communication partner that holds a consistent ontology. However, if the trigger sequence stems from different communication partners that hold different (conflicting) ontologies, the preservation of one's own terminology might be preferable to a struggle to adapt to the terminology of the trigger sequence.
Type-2 operators, on the other hand, attempt to adapt to the terminology of the communication partner by assigning the readings underlying the trigger statements to the commonly used terms in the case of conflicts. To relate these readings to the initial ontology, the operators implement different hypotheses regarding the semantic relations between the different readings of the common term. Since such hypotheses might turn out to produce new conflicts, a detailed analysis of the different options is required. The results presented in this article show a general conflict between two goals for operators that adapt to the terminology of the trigger statement. On the one hand, stable behavior during the integration of sequences of information can be guaranteed only on the basis of weak hypotheses regarding the bridging axioms relating the different readings of the term. On the other hand, only stronger operators yield useful semantic specifications of the common terms when the semantic relations between the different readings are not just a matter of one term being more general than the other.
The main problem underlying the inability to derive a stable terminology with useful semantic specifications of the different readings of a common term derives from the restricted information available to the operator in each single step. Additionally, the result of the integration process depends strongly on the order within the sequence. This suggests that integration steps should preferably be applied to larger chunks of information. Nevertheless, when we consider extensions of the ontology-revision operators that combine two ontologies [21] , then the successive integration of sequences of ontologies into one ontology will yield similar cases of instability as discussed in this article.
Observation 8.1
Let O be an ontology and M 1 , M 2 be sets of formulae over the vocabulary
Let a ∈ V c be a constant, α = K(a) or α = ¬K(a), and • 1 and • 2 be a pair of corresponding type-1 and type-2 operators.
Proof of Parts of Observation 5.1 (p. 13).
Proof of 5. 
where BA is a set of bridging axioms and σ is a substitution mapping all symbols to themselves or to a newly introduced symbol that is not in V c ∪ V(O). According to all definitions, each bridging axiom uses the new symbol. Also, ασ contains this symbol. Therefore,
where BA is a set of bridging axioms and σ is a substitution restricted as in the first case. According to all definitions, each bridging axiom uses the new symbol. In addition, all formulae in Oσ that are not in O use the new symbol. Therefore,
Proof of 5.1.5 and 5.1.6.
∩V p , σ be a concept substitution, and M be a set of formulae over
Since in the case of reinterpretation the same substitution is chosen according to the assumption that the choice of a symbol K ∈ V p in the reinterpretation step is uniquely determined by symbol K and 
Define the modification J of I by setting 
Proof of Proposition 5.2 (p. 15).
We will prove the more elaborate Proposition 8.2 as parts 1 and 2 can more easily be proved in the context of part 3.
Proposition 8.2
For any ontology O over V c ∪ V p with V c ∩ V p = ∅, finite sequence A of literals over V c , and ontology-revision operator • there are two substitutions of concept symbols (σ and ρ), such that
, the neutral substitution fulfills the conditions for σ and ρ.
Let A = A n+1 be a sequence of literals over V c of length n + 1 and the assumption be proved for A n , such that σ n and ρ n are the substitutions fulfilling all conditions of this proposition.
If
and therefore α n+1 = α n+1 ρ n . Thus, σ n and ρ n do the job for A n+1 as well as for
and K is introduced to resolve the conflict.
Let ρ n+1 be the composition of [K /K] and ρ n . It is easy to verify that this choice of ρ n+1 fulfills the condition 3 of this proposition, given that ρ n fulfills this condition.
Since 
Consequently, part 2 holds in the case of type-2 operators. In this case let σ n+1 be the composition of σ n and We show the proposition for positive literals α = K(a). Let K be the new concept symbol introduced by the reinterpretation rule and 
, the modification of the models in the proofs will be more readable. For the other direction, we begin with the case α = K(a) and consider 2 in place of
} and hence J |= β. As L does not occur in β, this means that also I |= β. We have shown the assertion that if O 2 K(a) |= β, then O |= β. The general assertion for • 2 follows with Observation 5.1.11.
The case α = ¬K(a) can be proved in the same fashion, but this time selecting J based on I with
= c, and I |= K(c) follows. If, on the other hand, a
The general assertion for • 2 then follows with Observation 5.1.11. Applying the substitution σ to both sides of the entailment results in the task to show
The proof for the other case (α = ¬K(a) and γ = ¬K(c)) is similar, using the modification J of the model
Proof 
Assume O |= ¬msc O (a)(c). Let I be a model of O∪{msc O (a)(c)} and construct J as the modification of I with
Assume O |= ¬K(c).
For the other case (α = ¬K(a) and γ = ¬K(c)) the proof is similar. In the second part one has to construct the modification J of interpretation I such that
Observation 8.3
Let V be a vocabulary, K, K ∈ V concept symbols, O an ontology, A a sequence of literals with finiteÃ such that V(O ∪Ã) ⊆ V \ {K }, α ∈Ã, and A n a finite prefix of A.
We prove
and L does not occur in γ, then γ ∈ M , and J |= γ derives from I |= γ and the construction of J . Proof of Corollary 7.9 (p. 20). Let V be a vocabulary, K ∈ V a concept symbol, a, c ∈ V constants, A = α i i∈{1,...,n} a finite sequence of literals over V, O an ontology over V.
Let A = α i i∈{1,...,n+2} be the extension of A with α n+1 = K(c), α n+2 = K(a).
K} (for some K not occurring in O) and according to Lemma 7.7.2,
2. Corresponding to part 1 of this proof considering ¬K(a) and ¬K(c) instead of K(a) and K(c). Proof of Theorem 7.12 (p. 20) . Let O be a consistent ontology, A a sequence of literals with finiteÃ such that for every n ∈ N the set O ⊗ 2 A n ∪ una(A n ) is consistent. Let A k be a prefix of A withÃ =Ã k . Let i ≥ k be such that all literals ofÃ that occur at least once after k occur between k and i. Because of Lemma 7.8. 
Definition 8.9
For a set of formulae M and a concept symbol K let M K = {β ∈ M | β contains K} be the subset of formulae of M that syntactically contain K. = {{B(a)}, {C(a)}, {D(a)}, {B(b)}, {D(c)}, {B(d)}} The (infinite) sequence A is the systematic repetition of the sequence A. After each round of 16 steps, the same set of literals over V c are consequences of the resulting ontology and the same set of conflicting literals is re-established. Therefore, the sequence of ontologies generated during the integration process does not stabilize.
As O and A conform to the restrictions described in Corollary 8.12, the sequence of ontologies generated by 2 and ⊕ B, (C ¬C ) (¬B ¬D ¬E), (B ¬B ) (C ¬C )}. All of the following steps follow these two patterns. Either there is no conflict (steps 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16 ) and a simple expansion occurs, or a conflict occurs (steps 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14) where the difference between the two readings is subsumed by the difference between the readings of other ambiguous terms disambiguated in an earlier step. This ordering of differences is established since no ontology derived during the integration sequence can prove that the individuals named by the constant can be distinguished based on the concepts involved.
The resulting ontology O 16 = O Integrating this sequence using the operator ⊕ A allows the derivation of ¬Cheap(th 2 ) and of Cheap(th 1 ) (using Cheap (th 1 ), ¬CostLt_5(th 1 ), and Cheap Cheap CostLt_5). Thus, it agrees with O S regarding the value-for-money judgements. Furthermore, the additional bridging axioms introduced to relate the different readings of the term Cheap result in an approximation of the meaning of the common symbol within the sender's ontology, as both O S and O R ⊕ expl 2
A have the following statements as consequences: books that cost less than 3 Euros are cheap (CostLt_3 Cheap), cheap books cost less than 8 Euros (Cheap CostLt_8), books under 5 Euros that are not booklets are cheap (CostLt_5 ¬Booklet Cheap), and cheap books that are not hardcover books cost less then 5 Euros Cheap ¬HardC CostLt_5.
